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Abstract
Background: Why issues get on the policy agenda, move into policy formulation and implementation while others
drop off in the process is an important field of enquiry to inform public social policy development and implementation.
This paper seeks to advance our understanding of health policy agenda setting, formulation and implementation
processes in Ghana, a lower middle income country by exploring how and why less than three months into the
implementation of a pilot prior to national scale up; primary care maternal services that were part of the basket
of services in a primary care per capita national health insurance scheme provider payment system dropped off
the agenda.
Methods: We used a case study design to systematically reconstruct the decisions and actions surrounding the
rise and fall of primary care maternal health services from the capitation policy. Data was collected from July
2012 and August 2014 through in-depth interviews, observations and document review. The data was analysed
drawing on concepts of policy resistance, power and arenas of conflict.
Results: During the agenda setting and policy formulation stages; predominantly technical policy actors within
the bureaucratic arena used their expertise and authority for consensus building to get antenatal, normal delivery
and postnatal services included in the primary care per capita payment system. Once policy implementation started,
policy makers were faced with unanticipated resistance. Service providers, especially the private self-financing used
their professional knowledge and skills, access to political and social power and street level bureaucrat power to
contest and resist various aspects of the policy and its implementation arrangements – including the inclusion of
primary care maternal health services. The context of intense public arena conflicts and controversy in an election
year added to the high level political anxiety generated by the contestation. The President and Minister of Health
responded and removed antenatal, normal delivery and postnatal care from the per capita package.
Conclusion: The tensions and complicated relationships between technical considerations and politics and
bureaucratic versus public arenas of conflict are important influences that can cause items to rise and fall on
policy agendas.
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Background
Why some issues get on the policy agenda, move into
policy formulation and implementation while others drop
off in the process is an important field of enquiry to in-
form public social policy development and implementa-
tion. Despite several published studies on how issues gain
prominence [1–4]; or are periodically re-examined and
maintained on an agenda over time [5–7] there remains a
relative dearth of work on these issues from Low and
Middle Income Countries (LMICs) [8].
To advance our understanding in this area of work;
the current investigation in Ghana, a lower middle in-
come country explored how in the implementation pro-
cesses of a pilot prior to national scale up; antenatal,
normal delivery and postnatal services that were initially
included as part of the basket of services in a primary
care per capita National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS)
provider payment system dropped off the agenda. Under a
per capita provider payment system (capitation), accre-
dited health service providers receive in advance, a prede-
termined lump sum payment to provide a defined package
of services for each enrollee with the provider for a fixed
period [9, 10]. The predetermined lump is computed to
reflect the average cost of providing the defined package
of services to the enrolled population. The amount is paid
whether or not the enrollees make use of services within
the payment period. Providers therefore have strong in-
centives to minimise their financial cost. Since the com-
pensation package is decided prospectively, providers can
maximize the difference between their earnings and costs
by simply keeping costs down. There is no limit on the
number of times the enrollee can seek services from the
provider, and providers therefore have an incentive to
limit the quantity of services provided to the patient per
visit as a preferred approach to reducing their operating
cost [11–13].
In 2010 the National Health Insurance Authority
(NHIA) commenced a process to design and implement
a per capita provider payment system in Ghana on a
pilot basis. The stated objectives for the introduction of
the per capita payment system were to: (1) improve cost
containment, efficiency and effectiveness of health services
through more rational resource use. (2) share financial risk
between schemes, providers and subscribers. (3) introduce
managed competition for providers and choice for patients
to increase the responsiveness of the health system. (4) cor-
rect some imbalances created by using the Ghana Diagnos-
tic Related Groupings payment system for outpatient care
such as outpatient supplier-induced demand. (5) simplify
claims processing and (6) address difficulties in forecasting
and budgeting. The approach of a pilot in one region be-
fore nationwide implementation was to “enable testing
of the overall effectiveness of the designed system in
achieving the identified objectives, identify key features
of implementation that would be essential for success in
scale-up after the pilot” [11]. Ashanti region where im-
plementation of the capitation was piloted has 19 % of
Ghana’s population – making it the region with the largest
proportion of Ghana’s population. It reflects the diversity
of Ghana from the complex metropolis of Kumasi the re-
gional capital to deprived remote rural areas like parts of
the Afram plains [14].
The use of per capita provider payment system in health
insurance is not new. Health insurance schemes in middle
income countries like Argentina, Brazil, Nicaragua and
Thailand have adopted capitation payment as a means to
remunerate public and private providers [15]. However,
for the lower middle income country in Sub-Saharan
Africa that Ghana was in 2010 and currently remains, it
was a major innovation. In Ghana, capitation was men-
tioned in the National Health Insurance law (Act 650)
and legislative instrument at the inception of the scheme
in 2003 as one of the payment mechanisms to be explored
[16, 17] and thus already on the strategic purchasing
agenda. However, it remained dormant, largely because of
a sense that the experience to implement it was lacking;
until it re-emerged in 2010 with the NHIA decision to re-
form the provider payment system.
Primary care maternity services were included in the
capitation basket of services in the initial design, and
implementation started in January 2012 in the Ashanti
region. However, by March 16, 2012 after less than three
months implementation of the policy amid heavy public
arena social and political contestation of the policy; pri-
mary care maternal health services were removed from
the basket of service. The specific research questions this
study tries to answer are: Who were the policy actors in-
volved? How did they include and subsequently exclude
primary care maternity services in the capitation policy
and why? This analysis firstly provides insights on how
and why primary care maternal health services got
onto the capitation policy agenda, implemented and
later removed. Secondly, it contributes to the general
understanding of policy agenda setting, formulation
and implementation in a LMIC setting.
National health insurance provider payment mechanisms
in Ghana
In September 2003, Ghana passed a National Health
Insurance Law (Act 650) to provide the legal backing
for the implementation of a national health insurance
scheme that would ensure all residents access to basic
healthcare services [17]. Implementation started in
January 2004. A National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF)
established as part of the implementation arrangements
had as its funding sources a national health insurance levy
of 2.5 % value added tax on selected goods and services,
2.5% of all Social Security and National Insurance Trust
Koduah et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2016) 16:323 Page 2 of 14
(SSNIT) contributions; registration fees from all enrollees
and premiums from non SSNIT contributors.
NHIS provider payment mechanisms have evolved
over time. In 2004, NHIA started with itemized billing
with no standardized fee schedule for services and medi-
cines. Each of the district schemes negotiated with their
providers itemized fee rates for services, consumables,
and medicines. In the face of growing concerns over in-
efficiencies such as random price variations for the same
procedures and consumables, cumbersome billing and
claim vetting procedures and cost escalation, NHIA in
2008, introduced a case based payment mechanism known
as the Ghana – Diagnosis Related Groups (G-DRG) for
clinical services and procedures; and standardized itemized
fees for medicines based on a periodically revised medicine
list. The G-DRG is an adaptation of the DRG approach, in
that although it has the patient classification system, it does
not have cost weights and severity levels. The G-DRG and
itemised fees for medicines are applied nationwide for all
levels of care from the lowest (Community Health Plan-
ning and Services compounds) to the highest (Teaching
hospitals), to pay all accredited providers – public, quasi-
government, and private – for inpatient and outpatient
services. A study of Ghana’s NHIS provider payment and
service supply behaviour and incentives by Agyepong et al.
(2014) found that financial incentives to service supply were
mixed. For example the G-DRG design allows a provider to
bill for three visits for outpatient care – the initial visit and
two follow-up visits. It could be to the financial advantage
of the provider to bill routinely for all three visits regardless
of whether the client needed or even made them. On the
contrary, the bundled payments of the G-DRG for services
were a disincentive to carry out extensive diagnostic investi-
gations whether they were needed or not. Additionally,
there was less financial incentive to over prescribe than
would be expected under the itemized fee for service billing
system, because of the actuality as well as the perception of
too low tariffs that negated, in part, incentives to prescribe
and dispense unneeded medicines [18].
Payment to providers for services and medicines was
and remains retrospective. Section 38 of the legislative
instrument (LI 1809) recommended schemes to pay
claims within four weeks after receipt from a health care
facility. In practice, it takes much longer. Providers file
claims, which go through a vetting process in the NHIA
district scheme offices or for the higher-level facilities
such as teaching and regional hospitals in the computer-
ized central claims processing office of the NHIA before
final payment. The claims processes of many provider
and district scheme offices remain predominantly man-
ual despite increasing computerization [17, 19].
Maternal health is a national priority and reducing fi-
nancial barriers is one of governments’ interventions to
improve outcomes. Related to this, in 2008 Ghana started
implementing its free maternal health care policy under
the NHIS and reimburses service providers through the
G-DRG payment mechanism for these services. Table 1
describes the benefits under the free maternal care
policy [20].
Methods
Study design and data collection
We used a case study design because it allows collection
and analysis of comprehensive and systematic data at dif-
ferent points in a real-life context to trace policy discus-
sions and change over time [21, 22]. Data was collected
between July 2012 and August 2014 using in-depth inter-
views, document reviews, observations and feedback dis-
cussions with respondents. The in-depth interviews were
conducted to obtain real-life experiences from key actors
involved in the decision making and pilot implementation
of the per capita payment system especially in relation to
maternity services. The interviews lasting on average 1 h
were conducted face to face using a semi-structured guide
to investigate how policy actors included and later ex-
cluded primary care maternal services from the capitation
policy. AK (one of the authors) interviewed twenty-eight
respondents summarized in Table 2. For confidentiality,
names and positions are not used. Ten of these were iden-
tified from the documents review and the rest (18) were
suggested by other respondents.
Document analysis was used to map the sequence of
decisions and actions, identify actors’ roles and further
triangulate findings with respondent’s information. We
conducted content analyses of provider payment mechan-
ism technical subcommittee meeting records and reports
(2010–2012); press releases and media discussions from
the Ghana News Agency archive related to the policy.
To understand decision making dynamics and interac-
tions in the Ghanaian health sector, a 20 month period
of practical attachment at the MOH Policy Planning
Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate (PPMED) was
undertaken by AK (one of the authors) as a participant
observer. The PPMED coordinates policy formulation
Table 1 Benefit under the free maternal care policy
• No premium for fresh registration or renewal of membership
• No processing fee for registration or renewal
• Antenatal period: free antenatal, general services and medicines
• Delivery: free service and medicines, including caesarean
• Postnatal period: free services and medicines
• Full year cover no matter when pregnant woman registers
• Free care for the baby on mother’s NHIS ticket for 90 days
• Alternatively the baby can be treated free on the father or other
designated guardian
• After 90 days the child can be registered as an individual under
18 (no premium but processing fee required)
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and strategic planning for the health sector. As a result,
there were interactions with the key regional and district
health actors during the MOH joint monitoring team
visit to Ashanti region (6th - 9th November 2012). Further
interactions with key actors during a December 21–22,
2012 national health insurance stakeholder meeting in
Accra and a February 12, 2013 capitation evaluation meet-
ing in the Ashanti region gave insights into the varied
opinions on the capitation policy.
The initial findings were validated and further substan-
tiated by a presentation for discussion, comments and
critique at an August 29, 2014 provider payment mech-
anism technical subcommittee meeting.
Analysis concepts
We drew from Mintzberg’s power concept to guide the
analysis of what powers policy actors used to control de-
cisions and actions related to the rise and fall of primary
care maternal health service capitation policy. Mintzberg
(1983) defines power as the capacity to effect (or affect)
decisions and actions and labels an actor who seek to
control decisions and actions as influencer. Mintzberg
argues that influencer’s interpretative manoeuvres ability
vary as each tries to use his or her own source of power
as means of influence in a politically skilled way. He
proposes the sources of power as the control of a
resource, a technical skill, or a body of knowledge;
authority by virtue of one’s legal and structural position;
and access to those who can rely on the other four
sources of power [23].
To analyse policy actors’ responses and actions related
to the rise and fall of the policy; we drew on the concept
of arenas of conflict of Grindle and Thomas (1991).
Grindle and Thomas (1991) observed that decisions to
change existing practice almost always generate conflict.
They described two broad scenarios of reactions or re-
sponse to policy change – conflict in the public arena
and bureaucratic arena. Conflict to policy change in the
public arena usually occurs during implementation and
when the costs or burden of the reform has a direct im-
pact on the public or on politically important groups in
society. On the other hand, conflict in the bureaucratic
arena is largely determined by bureaucratic agencies and
public official’s response to the change. This usually oc-
curs during policy formulation especially when the admin-
istrative content of the policy is high or it is technically
complex and requires coordinated efforts of public offi-
cials and agencies through consensus building to design
the reform [24].
To understand and analyse how providers were able to
resist the policy in addition to their use of power; we
drew on Sterman’s (2006) concept of policy resistance.
Sterman (2006) conceptualises policy resistance as the
tendency for a policy to be defeated by a system’s response
to the policy itself. He argues policy resistance arises
because the system is complex made up of separate but
interdependent parts that interact with each other in
many ways. The system is therefore dynamic, evolving,
interconnected and governed by feedback loops. He fur-
ther argues that within a system decisions and actions
feedback on themselves, triggering others to act thus giv-
ing rise to a new situation. Policy actors operate within
this complex system and their actions and decisions alter
the system and, therefore may trigger unanticipated ef-
fects. Others seeking to achieve their goals and acting
to restore the balance may also trigger intended and
unintended consequences. Policy resistance arises because
policy actors are not aware of the full range of feedback
surrounding – and created – by their decisions [25].
Drawing upon these concepts, we systematically
attempted to reconstruct the case of decisions and actions
surrounding the rise and fall of primary care maternal
health service capitation policy in the Ashanti region. The
information was analysed first to map events and the
power sources of key policy actors. A stakeholder analysis
of actors as individuals, groups and institutions was done
to further understand their position, interest and use of
power to influence. Next the evolution of decisions and
actions, the formation of groupings were identified. Fi-
nally, the analyses were synthesised to reconstruct insofar
as possible the case. We acknowledge the difficulty in pro-
viding a full explanation of events as they unfolded within
the dynamic health system – reconstructing who said
what, where, when, to whom and how it was received. To
minimise this multiple research methods and data sources
were used. Where such data is available, it is noted;
Table 2 List of respondents by agency /role in the health
sector in relation to capitation
Respondents Number
Ministry of Health 4
National Health Insurance Authority 4
Ghana Health Service headquarters 2
Ashanti regional health directorate 2
Provider Payment Mechanism Technical Sub Committee 2
Society of Private Medical and Dental Practitioners 2
Christian Health Association of Ghana head office 1
Public health facility in the Ashanti region 4
Christian Health Association of Ghana health facility in
Ashanti region
1
Private self-financing (for profit) health facility in Ashanti
Region.
3
Government politician 1
Opposition politician 1
Coalition of non-governmental organizations in Health -
Ashanti regional representative
1
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otherwise, the gap is noted and possible inferences are
made from data analysis.
Results
Technical analysis: the rise of primary care maternal
health service capitation policy
Capitation provider payment: an active policy option
Health service cost containment was the main driver for
the NHIA provider payment reforms. The financial chal-
lenge was twofold – increasing claims cost accompanied
by a much lower rate of increase of the NHIF [26, 27] as
summarized in Fig. 1 (Trend of NHIS income and ex-
penditure 2007 to 2011) [28]. The NHIA attributed the
financial challenge, first to increased number of enrollees.
For instance, the number of registered pregnant women
more than doubled from 421,234 in 2008 to 1,277,819 in
2010. And, second to overbilling practices such as service
providers billing the NHIS for multiple visits that did not
occur [20, 29].
Primary care maternal health service capitation policy
agenda and formulation
The NHIA with the assistance of the World Bank sup-
ported health insurance project established the Pro-
vider Payment Mechanism Technical Sub-Committee
(henceforth Committee), in June 2010. The Committee
with health financing and implementation expertise and
authority to design the capitation policy comprised offi-
cials of the NHIA, MOH, Ghana Health Service (GHS),
Christian Health Association of Ghana (CHAG), Korle Bu
Teaching Hospital and a national representative of the
Society of Private Medical and Dental Practitioners
(SPMDP). The Committee assessed the financial situ-
ation of the NHIS and noted that the G-DRG payment
system had not contained cost particularly outpatient
services claims. Furthermore outpatient claims was ac-
counting for 70 % of NHIS claims with an increased
average claims of 50 % between 2007 and 2009. To
ensure that a routine package of services was paid for
by a standard capitation rate across the country, the
Committee agreed on a basic basket of service for walk-in
outpatient department (OPD) to be paid for by capitation.
The original basket of services classified as the primary
health care (PHC) bundle is listed in Table 3.
The Committee’s technical consideration of the finan-
cial and sustainability challenges of the NHIS alongside
what should be essential primary health care in Ghana
and therefore what should be included in the per capita
basket of services presented a window of opportunity to
reform not only health financing but also maternal health
service delivery. The NHIS per capita provider payment
reform was also needed to address some of the long stand-
ing challenges associated with delayed reimbursement to
providers. There had been numerous instances where pro-
viders suspended services to NHIS enrollees because of
delayed payments from the NHIA [30, 31] and this may
be due to long vetting processes [19] and the fact that
NHIA expenditure is higher than its income [32]. The ad-
verse effect of services suspension on maternal health was
that expectant mothers had to pay out-of-pocket at the
point of use to access a ‘free’ service. The upfront payment
to providers that capitation mechanism offers was a
potential to reduce if not prevent such happenings.
Prompt payments of capitation rate to providers may
not be guaranteed, however the delays may be minimal
because the amount is predetermined and claims vet-
ting is excluded. Capitation also holds service pro-
viders financially responsible for services they deliver
and this provides strong incentives for them to inte-
grate activities and reduce cost [33]. Therefore includ-
ing antenatal, normal delivery and postnatal services
which can be provided at primary care level in the
capitation basket of service was to ensure continuity in
care because capitation payments mechanism could
minimise provider’s tendency to suspense services to
primary health care.
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Fig. 1 Trend of NHIS income and expenditure 2007 to 2011
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The Committee also agreed on the following that: (1)
a provider must demonstrate the availability of the listed
services within the facility to be accredited as a primary
care provider to receive a capitation fee. (2) capitation
would be limited to this primary health care bundle and
all other services would continue to be paid for by the
already existing G-DRG for services and itemized fee for
medicines [11]. Review of the committee’s reports and
meeting records shows decisions including those on per
capita rate and enrolment requirement before pilot start
were based on consensus building within the Committee;
after a back and forth process of discussions. Medicines
dropped off the basket of services before it moved into im-
plementation because of stakeholder and technical con-
cerns that it was not clear how best to implement a
capitation basket that included medicines in the context
of Ghana’s health system. It was decided to continue to
pay for all medicines under the itemized fee for service.
Primary care maternal health service capitation policy
stakeholder education and advocacy
The NHIS is a major health service purchaser and its
sustainability is a major national concern. Ways to ensure
its sustainability had been discussed at many fora. As a re-
sult, at the health sector multi stakeholder November
2011 meeting, participants welcomed the introduction of
the capitation policy for primary health care services as a
measure to improve efficiency and contain cost [34].
During the pre-implementation phase the Committee
and officials of the NHIA held series of fora to inform
stakeholders from local to national level on key policy
principles. Several of these were covered by the media
for example forum with the Asante-Akin South District
Assembly at Juaso [35]. District health insurance schemes
and the regional implementation committee; representa-
tives of the MOH, GHS, CHAG and health professional
bodies; and private self-financing providers were all partic-
ipants at these fora [36].
The NHIA brought on board politicians to inform and
solicit bipartisan support. This included members of the
Parliamentary Select Committee on health – elected par-
liamentarians with the mandate to advice the Parliament
on health issues - and members of Parliament represent-
ing all constituencies in the Ashanti region. Additionally
local government was engaged through the regional co-
ordinating council and the district chief executives in the
Ashanti region [36, 37]. However, the political approval
from politicians may have influenced resistance from
some stakeholders. As a policy implementer noted –
‘involving politicians created the impression that capitation
policy was a political issue, putting a political connotation
on the policy’ [9/11/2012].
Contestation: the fall of primary care maternal health
service capitation policy
Service providers especially the private self-financing
(private for profit) contested and resisted the policy in-
tent and implementation in the run up to and during
implementation. Service providers wield a lot of power
based on multiple sources including their knowledge,
skills, authority, social and professional identity and ac-
cess to other influencers such as the Minister of Health
and NHIS enrollees. The access to NHIS enrollees, the
discretion required by the nature of their work, public
respect and trust for as well as dependence on their skills
and knowledge gave them major “street level bureaucrat”
[38] power. The Minister of Health and NHIS enrollees
were not actively involved in the policy design, but had
the power to influence the policy process when mobilized.
These power sources closely parallel those suggested by
Mintzberg (1983).
Service providers’ contestation and resistance created
unanticipated effects. There was intense media attention
and discussions across the country and not only in the
Ashanti region where the pilot was taking place. A mo-
bilized pressure group – Ashanti Development Union -
sprung up to oppose the capitation policy. Stakeholders
called for the policy to be suspended, and private self –
financing providers finally suspended services to NHIS
subscribers as part of their protest against the policy.
Apart from the contestation by the service providers, the
fact that 2012 was an election year fueled the public
arenas of contestation and high politics as commentators
from both sides of the political divide joined the media
discussions and increasing acrimony. All these finally
cascaded into a crisis situation and gained the attention
of the President and the Minister of Health. We discuss
in more detail below these stakeholder’s arguments, un-
anticipated effects, and the committee’s and government’s
responses and actions using specific contested issues to
illustrate.
Table 3 Capitation basket of services (Primary health care bundle)
1. Primary health care outpatient department consultation
2. Maternity consultation and services with a trained midwife or
doctor for antenatal, normal delivery and postnatal
3. Medicines for services included in the capitation package
4. Selected laboratory services that can be performed at all levels,
namely:
• Routine Urine
• Malaria Test
• Blood Test
• Pregnancy Test
• Venereal Diseases Research Laboratory Test
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Stakeholder’s arguments
Policy resistance to including maternity services had
started to build up even before implementation finally
started in January 2012. The main contested issues in-
cluded: the per capita rate, the enrolment rate, rationale
for using the Ashanti region as a pilot site and ‘all or
nothing’ choice scenarios that confronted the service
providers.
Per capita rate The per capita rate for the basket of ser-
vices was computed from a combination of an analysis
of historical NHIS annual expenditure on the services in
the basket against annual enrolment; and an estimate of
the NHIA ability to pay. The per capita rate was then
adjusted further for service fixed cost difference between
private and public health facilities [11]. The calculation
of the per capita rate drew from the G-DRG payment
system data. Even in the computation of the G-DRG
rates, there had and continued to be challenges related
to data quality and completeness and the need therefore
to model and estimate. However this was the best data
available and the G-DRG system had been developed
with it and accepted by providers [18].
Providers – public and private – raised several concerns
with the per capita rate and its calculation. First, they felt
the per capita rate was too low. In response to this the
Committee reassessed and increased the rate by 22 % [36].
However the SPMDP and providers under the Manhyia
health insurance scheme disputed and maintained the
revised rate was still inadequate. Discrepancies between
provider and scheme data on claims and utilization cre-
ated a data gap and made it difficult for either the NHIA
or providers to be certain about the appropriate rate for
the PHC bundle.
Providers also argued that the gains made under the free
maternal care policy would be derailed under the capita-
tion policy since there would be incentive to reduce ser-
vice inputs.
‘Maternity service is a priority for the country and also
for the MDGs, maternal mortality will increase if
maternity service is put under capitation. Under
capitation, there will be restricted services and this
will affect the quality of care given - for example the
number of antenatal may be reduced by the provider’
[GHS staff, 9/11/2012].
Thirdly the per capita rate was a single flat rate with no
risk adjustment. The data quality problems did not make
risk adjustment possible. Providers argued that the type of
enrollees played an essential role in the nature of the fi-
nancial risk borne by providers. They anticipated their risk
to be much higher with more enrolled pregnant women.
‘The outcome of pregnancy is certain and that is
delivery. If maternal service is capitated, we (providers)
will bear most of the financial risk [Public Provider,
5/11/2012].
Fourthly and related to the preceding arguments, they
anticipated the low rate would ruin their health care
business.
‘This capitation policy will collapse health care system
and business in the Ashanti region because the per
capita rate is too low and we cannot provides services
with such small amount’ [SPMDP, 7/11/2012].
Finally, providers claimed to be unable to understand
the method of rate computation.
‘We (providers) do not understand how the capitated
rate was calculated’ [SPMDP, 8 /11 /2012].
Table 4 shows the per capita rate for implementation
as of July 2011 after the 22 % upward adjustment.
Enrolment rate Per capita payment systems use the
transfer of an average rate per enrollee. This way in
any given period, the money of those who do not use
the system helps to take care of those who use the
system. Under these circumstances it is essential that
100 % of active enrollees voluntarily chose a preferred
primary care provider (PPP) or are administratively
assigned to a PPP to avoid short changing providers
in the per capita transfers. The method chosen for
enrolment to PPP in the Ghana per capita payment
system design was voluntary enrolment. It was how-
ever acknowledged that it would be impossible to get
100 % voluntary enrolment. The Committee therefore
stipulated that an at least 80 % voluntary enrolment
rate needed to be attained and then the remaining
enrollees would be administratively assigned for the
implementation start. But, by December, 31 2011,
only 46 % of the active NHIS subscribers had volun-
tarily enrolled with a PPP. The SPMDP and providers
under the Manhyia health insurance scheme contested
the start date given that 80 % enrolment to PPP had
not been attained. The Committee attributed low en-
rolment rate to logistics, staffing and financial con-
straints as well as poor management of the enrolment
process. There were also communication challenges
such as people considering enrolment information as
political propaganda [36]. Because of the slow pro-
gress in enrolment, the Committee had already shifted
the start date from August 2011 to October 2011 and
again to December 2011 in a quest to attain closer to
80 % voluntary enrolment. By October 2011, the
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Table 4 Per capita rate per health facility ownership for implementation as of July 2011
Provider Ownership Capitation Rate (GH¢) Clinical Service
(Per Member Per Month)
Capitation Rate (GH¢) Medicines
(Per Member Per Month)
Total Rate (GH¢) Clinical Service &
Medicines (Per Member Per Month)
Total Rate (USD) Clinical Service &
Medicines (Per Member Per Month)
Private self-financed 1.11 0.64 1.75 1.16
Government 0.59 0.64 1.23 0.81
Mission-based 0.79 0.64 1.43 0.95
Source: Preferred Primary Provider Group Practice Guidelines, July 2011, National Health Insurance Authority. Conversion from Ghanaian cedis (GH¢) to US dollars; exchange rate at 4.00 pm universal time on 31st July
2011 - 1GH¢ = 0.662USD. http://www.xe.com/currencytables/?from=GHS&date=2011-07-31
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Committee felt it was no longer appropriate to keep
changing the start date. 2012 was an election year
and after the first quarter of the year it would be im-
possible to introduce any reform as major as capita-
tion. A lot of time, money and effort had already
been invested in designing the policy and accompany-
ing programmes and trying to move them into imple-
mentation. Moreover, some stakeholders perceived the
frequent shift in start date as a sign of weakness and
a policy that was doomed to failure.
‘The continuous changing of the start date did not
help, it fuelled the perception that the NHIS is
collapsing ‘[GHS staff, 9/11/2012]. …‘postponing
several times the start date contributed to less
confidence in the policy implementation’ [Committee
member, 29/08/2014].
The Committee felt that given all these issues, the vol-
untary target of 80 % should be lowered and other strat-
egies devised to ensure 100 % of the insured had been
assigned to a PPP.
Suspicions about the rationale for the selection of
Ashanti region The mobilized pressure group –
Ashanti development union - and providers questioned
the rationale for selecting the region for the pilot. Some
claimed the region was chosen because NHIA labelled it
a ‘fraud region’.
‘NHIA brought capitation to the region because they
believe there is fraud and abuse here. So the focus is to
fight fraud’ [Private self-financing provider, 8/11/2012].
Others claimed the region was punished for its voting
patterns. The region is politically described as a New
Patriotic Party (NPP) – the party in opposition at the
time of introduction of the pilot – ‘stronghold’. The
NPP has consistently won the majority parliamentary
seats since the start of multi-party democracy in 1992.
For instance in the 2008 election, the NPP won 34 par-
liament seats while the National Democratic Congress
(NDC) that won the national presidential election had
only three [39]. The timing of the pilot in an election
year in addition to placing it in an opposition strong-
hold also fuelled the suspicions about the intent of the
reformers.
‘Some people believe this is political, this is to punish
the region for voting against the government in power.
The timing was also wrong, implementing such a
policy in an election year in an opposition dominated
region, it’s difficult to understand their (NHIA) motive’
[GHS staff, 28/8/2012].
‘All or nothing’ choice scenarios The policy implemen-
tation presented providers with ‘all or nothing’ choice
scenarios. Under the capitation policy developed by the
Committee any service beyond a normal delivery for ex-
ample assisted deliveries and caesareans were to be paid
for by the G-DRG. Providers who run primary as well as
referral care clinics could not opt out of being NHIS pro-
vider for primary care under a per capita system and con-
tinue to be provider for referral service care.
‘If you do not participate in capitation, you cannot
provide services for NHIS subscribers – unless the
subscriber pays out-of-pocket. This is not fair.’ [Private
self-financing health facility, 8/11/2012].
Accredited facilities needed to have the capacity to pro-
vide the whole basket of services to qualify as a preferred
primary care provider. Maternity homes are private facil-
ities run by nurse midwifes. They are licenced purely for
the provision of primary maternal care services such as
antenatal, delivery, postnatal and family planning. From a
legal point of view, Maternity homes could therefore not
become preferred primary care providers, since they were
not licenced to provide the other components of the pri-
mary care per capita package other than antenatal care,
normal delivery and postnatal care. Maternity homes
accounted for about 12 % of NHIS accredited providers in
the region [40, 41]. Maternity homes were particularly
concerned about this since though they were only licenced
in theory to provide maternity services, many provided
other primary care services. To date no one had applied
the law strictly, but what would happen under a per capita
payment system?
Within the package there were other services apart
from the maternity services, and as such the maternity
homes will not be able to be part of the capitation
payment system and they were going to lose out’
[NHIA official, 4/10/2012].
‘The position taken by the NHIA that facilities should
provide all the primary care bundle will collapse
maternity homes’ [SPMDP, 7/11/2012].
In response, the Committee recommended maternity
homes could be a PPP if they provided evidence of their
capacity to provide the whole basket of services. Such
evidence included forming a partnership or group prac-
tice with another clinic or a community pharmacy shop
with written agreements confirming that all the partners
understand and had agreed to group together as a ‘pri-
mary health care bundle provider’ [41]. This concept of
group practice was however new to Ghana. Private pro-
viders were unclear how to operationalize it, or even if
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they wanted to operationalize it. And there were all the
other objections to capitation.
Unanticipated effects
Policy redefined by opposing voices The private self-
financing providers made recommendations to promote
their desired outcomes, with contestation starting at the
bureaucratic level before implementation start in January
2012. In a petition dated October 5, 2011 to the NHIA
chief executive officer, the SPMDP suggested the removal
of maternal health service from the basket of services. The
SPMDP also recommended new per capita rates between
15–20 times the rates calculated by the NHIA for the PHC
bundle as listed in Table 5.
The SPMDP based their calculation on the rate of en-
counter with clients and the existing G-DRG payments
as estimated by the society. They noted any amount below
their request would immensely affect quality of health care
and subsequently collapse private self-financing clinics
and maternity homes. According to the SPMDP, in-
creasing cost of general goods and services was making
healthcare expensive so primary health care should not
be considered as a package of low-cost interventions.
On January 5, 2012 the NHIA therefore organised a
meeting to negotiate the basket of service and per capita
rate with leaders of the public and private providers, but
this ended in chaos with continuing disagreement be-
tween the NHIA and the private self-financing providers
on the basket of services and the per capita rate. The
SPMDP threatened to opt out of capitation. The NHIA
also threatened to abrogate all contracts with SPMDP
members, stating that private providers that did not im-
plement capitation would not be permitted to provide
services under the NHIS [42].
To increase their bargaining power the SPMDP and
the Ghana Registered Midwives Association (GRMA)
aligned, although they were affected differently by capi-
tation. SPMDP facilities were licensed to provide all the
basket of services while Maternity homes were not,
despite still providing a broader range of services in prac-
tice. SPMDP’s focus was to negotiate a higher per capita
rate and GRMA focus was to negotiate approval to pro-
vide all the basket of services to NHIS enrollees. To regis-
ter their objection they moved the discussions to the
public arena using the media; and issued a press release
on the January 11, 2012 stating: ‘We shall not start with
the pilot capitation under its present form. However, we
shall continue to render our services to our Health Insur-
ance Clients using the existing Ghana-Diagnosis Related
Groupings (G-DRG) package based on our contract with
the National Health Insurance Authority’. The unfolding
resistance and press release did not deter the NHIA’s in-
tent to continue implementation of the per capita pay-
ment system despite the strength of private self-financing
providers as key health players in the health sector and
the Ashanti region. According to the regional health dir-
ectorate 2010 half year report, the private maternity
homes and clinics operated two hundred and seventy-
eight (278) out of the five hundred and twenty-seven (527)
health facilities (53 %) in the region [43].
Increased media attention and calls for policy sus-
pension The media with its power to instantly reach
thousands of people served as a platform for many
stakeholders to convey their messages. Intense media
discussions built up as stakeholders discussed multiple
interpretations of the policy. Discussants, some with in-
adequate technical understanding shifted to political in-
terpretations that not only contributed to misinform,
but also publicized ideas and influenced others [36]. ‘Some
politicians and even some officials of the NHIA misunder-
stood the technical content of the capitation payment sys-
tem’ [Committee member, 29/08/2014]. For example, a
municipal chief executive (a political appointee), stated that
the capitation policy was not for ‘political witch hunting’
but to check corruption as most providers and some NHIS
officials had connived to loot the scheme resources
[44]. Such statements influenced political discussions
and shifted attention away from the intent and pur-
pose of the policy and the technical issues underlying
the disagreements.
Multiple interpretations and the unresolved negotiations
ultimately fuelled calls for the capitation policy postpone-
ment to allow agreement on contested issues. A range of
stakeholders - politicians (mainly opposition), private
self-financing providers, health professional bodies (Ghana
Medical Association and the Pharmaceutical Society of
Ghana), and the Ashanti development union joined the
call to suspend the pilot [45–48]. The opposition politi-
cians and supporters took to the streets to register their
disapproval [49] and the Ashanti development union
threatened a demonstration [47].
Table 5 Per capita rate recommended by the SPMDP in
December 2011
Facility Total Rate (GH¢) Clinical
Service & Medicines
(Per Member Per Month)
Total Rate (USD) Clinical
Service & Medicines
(Per Member Per Month)
Hospital 20.57 12.57
Clinic 18.14 11.08
Maternity 9.76 5.96
Source: Recommendation to the NHIA on pilot implementation of capitation
in Ashanti region, December 2011, Society of Private Medical and Dental
Practitioners
Conversion from Ghanaian cedis (GH¢) to US dollars; exchange rate at 4.00 pm
universal time on 31st December 2011 - 1GH¢ = 0.61087USD. http://www.xe.com/
currencytables/?from=GHS&date=2011-12-31
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Private providers suspended their services to NHIS
enrollees The NHIA did not postpone the capitation pol-
icy and did not give in to the demands of private self-
financing providers. Resistance reached its highest point
on February 1, 2012, when the private self-financing
clinics and Maternity homes operators suspended their
services to NHIS enrollees. They stated the policy was
imposed by the NHIA to the detriment of quality care
and health facilities in the region [50]. The suspension in-
cited further calls to postpone the policy and the oppos-
ition parliamentarians perceived it would lead to poor
maternal and child health outcomes [51].
Politics: the governments’ responses and actions
The resulting crisis escalated to a high politics situation,
attracting the attention of the President and the Minister
of Health. The President in his February 16, 2012 State
of the Nation Address to Parliament acknowledged the
crisis and called for urgent dialogue and consensus build-
ing on NHIS provider payment mechanisms to ensure
sustainability [52]. To intervene and build consensus, the
Minister of Health met both private and public providers
on February 29, 2012. The Minister assured providers
of government’s commitment to dialogue with all stake-
holders to design a comprehensive and sustainable
health financing policy for the benefit of all. He reiterated
government would not impose any policy to the detriment
of any group of people and pledged to convey their issues
to the President for immediate action [48].
Parliamentary and presidential elections were due to
be held in December 2012. Government stood to gain
political points by listening and responding favourably to
the opposing voices and to lose if they did not. By March
16, 2012, the government had taken a decision to have
primary care maternal health service removed from the
basket of service. NHIA was to reimburse accredited health
facilities through the G-DRG payment mechanism [53].
It is of interest to note that four years on, in 2016, capi-
tation is being scaled up in a step wise fashion with three
regions of Ghana set to begin implementation any time
soon. The process has been quiet and relatively free of the
rancour and contestation of the original pilot to date. The
reasons are a story in their own right. However part of it
is definitely the organizational learning that occurred from
the experiences of the pilot.
Discussion
This case illustrates the tensions and complicated relation-
ships between technical consideration, contestation and
political responsiveness in policy processes that combine
to determine the outcomes of policy agenda setting and
formulation, with the result of implementation processes
sometimes leading backwards to a revision of the policy
agenda and formulation.
The capitation payment mechanism was already legiti-
mised by Law (Act 650) but dormant until multiple con-
cern about financial challenges of running NHIS, high
outpatient (primary health care) claims and the increased
experience and technical skills with provider payment in
the country made it just ‘right’ to implement primary care
maternal health care services. We reason with Cook and
Skogan (1990) that factors such as policy legitimisation,
multiple source concern of an issue and a ‘ripe climate’
contribute to elevate the issue onto the agenda for im-
plementation [54].
Actions and decisions of opposing stakeholders (policy
influencers) led to the fall of primary care maternal health
services from the capitation policy. Opposing stakeholders
in this case, relied on their professional, political and social
sources of power to convince those to whom they had
access, project their problems and by that reframed the
issues to their benefit. They created a system of meaning
[55] as they reframed issues from their understanding as
well as ideas from others to manipulate revision of the
policy. As suggested by Stone (2012 p. 176) policy actors
use interpretation as strategic manipulation tool to frame
issues to lend legitimacy and attract support to a course of
action [56]. In our case and also noted by Agyei-Baffour et
al. (2013) [57], the media was venue for information and
rebuttal; and a breeding ground for multiple policy frames
as stakeholders convey their ideas and influenced others.
Decision making process related to the policy moved be-
yond the bureaucracy of the NHIA into the public arena
as media discussants and private self-financing providers
reframed the policy issues. In the bureaucratic arena,
though there were technical disagreements on what to in-
clude in the policy design, decisions were based on con-
sensus. Conversely, in the public arena discussion,
decisions were based on the media discussants and private
self-financing providers’ ability to manipulate interpreta-
tions of the policy in a politically skilful way to their benefit
[23] than facts. They used frames such as – “derail mater-
nal health”; “political punishment”; “fraud region”; and
“collapse health care” to make their arguments and gain
political attention.
Within the public arena, not only did opposing stake-
holders leverage their professional, political and social
power to reframe issues, but also benefited from the con-
text within which the policy was implemented to justify
their actions. For instance, the Ashanti development
group based on the political context – a ‘stronghold’ of
NPP - questioned the rationale for introducing the policy
in the region. Also, the private providers gained a high
bargaining power and were able to resist the policy be-
cause they operated about 53 % of the health facilities
in the region [43]. The fact is that private providers’ re-
sistance imposed limits on the NHIA and the Commit-
tee’s power on the policy implementation.
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Limits on power by resistance contribute to the out-
comes of power relations [58] and the outcomes at dif-
ferent stages of the policy process. In this case, power
relations existed between the NHIA and Committee on
one side and the private providers. During the formula-
tion process, the NHIA and Committee with the author-
ity and capacity and upper hand within the bureaucratic
arena designed the capitation policy for implementation.
On the other hand during the implementation process
there was a shift in power; private providers with profes-
sional knowledge and skill to implement policies bene-
fited from all the policy contestation within the public
arena gained the upper hand and in effect influenced the
removal of maternal primary care from the capitation
policy.
Despite the recognition of the importance of stake-
holder engagement and the use of a multi-stakeholder
Committee that included providers; stakeholder identifi-
cation, analysis and consultation was perhaps inadequate.
Contestation is often an inevitable part of policy reform,
and reform as major as provider payment with all the in-
centives inherent in different payment methods holds
huge potential for contestation. More careful stakeholder
analysis as part of the design and implementation process
might have perhaps made some of the problems that pre-
cipitated a crisis e.g. selecting an opposition region for
pilot of major reform; anticipated and perhaps avoided.
So what started as a seemingly quiet negotiation be-
tween the NHIA and private providers resulted in a dis-
pute; and like a ‘snowball’ lead to a series of unanticipated
effects. And as noted by Sterman (2006) and others, these
unanticipated effects are spontaneous and difficult to pre-
dict, and feeds back on its self - creating new situations
[25, 59]. In this case, the new situation – multiple issue
reframing - intensified the attention and interest of the
President and Minister of Health in the policy. Because,
politics is driven by how people interpret and reframe
information; and as such political actors strive to control
interpretations [56] and debunk any unfavourable ones.
So, the policy with the opportunity to contain NHIA
cost and improve continuous access to maternal health
care was overturn by high politics and political responsive-
ness of the government. In a nutshell, a strong competing
voice emerged within an enabling environment to dispute
the policy through repeated multiple issue reframes. These
factors are similar to those proposed by Cook and Skogan
(1990) in their work on the fall of criminal victimization
of the elderly from government’s agenda [54].
Conclusion
Policy formulation and implementation therefore is not
only about technical considerations but also how policy
influencers’ particularly opposing actors frame and re-
frame issues to generate political attention and response.
The tensions and complicated relationships between tech-
nical consideration, contestation and political responsiveness
in the capitation policy processes raises some questions we
pose for policy dialogue and further research. What is the
relationship between government policy makers and
private service providers in terms of government policy
implementation? How is health care service cost deter-
mined? The dynamics of this relationship and how
health care service delivery cost is calculated are vital
for the overall health care system quest to attain universal
health coverage and critical for government interventions
to improve access to health care services especially in
areas dominantly serviced by private providers.
The tensions and complicated relationships between
technical considerations and politics and bureaucratic
versus public arenas of conflict are important influences
that can cause items to rise and fall on policy agendas.
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